Ciceronian Review

It Is Everything

Prof. Fraser's argument is, in part, that there are interesting and serious losses when literature is dominated by white men, insights are lost (or never really offered).  (As already noted, it is hard to credit the white part unless the discussion is just of the UK or the USA.  I rather doubt white men are dominate in the literary production and consumption in China, India, Japan, etc.)  Her observation is, I think, correct.  A wide range of sources is more likely to generate information - here, expressions of and insights of a wider variety of people or characters.  I have found that true for myself, which is, to be honest, not much in the way of evidence.  

Still, it is not clear why that is an argument for dominance being an injustice.  An epistemological shortcoming, problem, deficiency, I agree.  We do better with a wider range of sources (all else being equal), and so there is, on this basis good reason to read a variety of authors, and authors with a variety of backgrounds and identities.  For convenience, we can rely on broad categories, as we do often in a variety of contexts.  So more women writers, and more writers (for folks like me) from other parts pf the world, and various social and economic classes.  But am I committing an injustice if I do not widen my reading?  Assume the questions from the prior post and move now to the question of what the injustice is or would be.  I think I need to find something that is not merely the instantiation in the production of literature of the general social and economic structure.  I do not think Prof. Fraser is arguing that the kind of late capitalism we are living in the US and UK is unjust -- well, maybe she is but focusing on literature if a peculiar way to go about it.  A change in this aspect of the economic world is not likely to have the right kinds of impact to alter the wider and more robust other areas of the economic order.  It is far stretch from more women writers to adequate child care and improved economic and social equality broadly.  One might make that sort of argument about integration of the upper reaches of corporate worlds, although I doubt it matters greatly that the demographics of exploitation alter.  Maybe, but even so assuming does not do much for the issue here.  It could be that Prof. Fraser is using the literary world as an example, except she never says that.

What sort of injustice is it that Prof. Fraser identifies?  Epistemic failures are moral failures?  Not doing the best one can with respect to imaginative empathy with others is a problem of justice?  I am stumped here.  I think a significant part of the reason is that I have difficulty with the notion that everything is a moral issue.  That disparities of every kind are problems for morality and/or justice.  Failing to fairly consider a manuscript because of demographic features of the author is sometimes a question of injustice.  But it is not always.  I can see a failure to fairly consider a manuscript for a book on modal logic from someone who lacks even a high school diploma would be a disappointment to the author, but, given ordinary constraints on time and resources, not an injustice. 

Duty to Read

Rachel Fraser has published an interesting essay, described at Daily Nous this way: What’s so bad about the literary dominance of white men? The essay (in New Statesman) has a slightly different title: Do We Have A Duty to Read Women Writers?  The second is, I think, better -- more accurate about the essay and a lot more interesting a proposal.  Fraser does not quite conclude that we have such a duty, but doe slay out a case for thinking that there is some injustice in the current state of literary affairs, understanding 'literary affairs' to mean the USA and UK (and maybe the EU?).  She does not say much and cites nothing showing white men dominating literary affairs in other parts of the world, e.g., India, China, Argentina, and so on.One could go on about that sort of oversight or gap, but it is not what I am interested in, which are two topics.  What is a duty to read some set of authors?  How widespread is an inability to name authors who are not men or not white (an opening gambit in the essay)?

A duty to read works by women....is there a duty to read at all?  That caused me to stumble.  When I stopped reading for some months, was I doing something immoral?  Would it matter why I stopped reading?  I suppose if there is such a duty, then, say, loss of eyesight might excuse not reading for a bit (while developing other skills for accessing literary works).  Would a challenging emotional event be sufficient excuse, or just fatigue?  It seems odd that one could a escape a moral by fatigue.  How serious a fatigue would it need to be?  Is the duty to read women at the same time a duty to buy books (or other works) by women from bookshops, etc.?  I mean, new volumes, is the duty one to buy books or read the books, or both?  I think it has to be one of the last two for Fraser because part of her case for a duty is an argument about the economic disparities of men and women authors.  (That part of her argument would apply quite broadly, in support of duties to buy motorcycles designed or manufactured by women (or maybe just sold by women?), clothing designed by women, restaurants owned by women, fly  as a passenger in planes piloted by women.)  My point is that if there is such a duty, it is pretty complicated duty to delineate.

If there is a duty to read works by women, what it call for us to do?  Read just anything written (or published?) by a woman?  Do I have to read Jane Austin or Virginia Woolfe, or is it enough to read Rita Mae Brown or Donna Leon?  (The economic part of Fraser's argument suggests that Austin and Woolfe are not in the game because no money flows to them from book sales.) 

I do not think, however, that there is a duty to read nor a duty to read literature by women.  I do not think there is a duty to buy art, or to listen to music (or particular sorts of music), or a duty to dance for that matter.  I do not have to attach duties to these activities to think them valuable or to think that they deserve social support, including state support.

Worstward West

I also recently read West's Normative Jurisprudence.   I had found a number of West's works interesting, and helpful, and so was looking forward to reading the Introduction.  Unfortunately, it turned out to be a terrible book.  It read as though a couple of articles had been mashed together.  The arguments seemed ill-considered in large and small ways.  And inconsistencies abounded.  Dworkin is a natural law theorist in chapter 1, while his account of judging is attributed to Legal Positivist in Chapter 3.  Legal Positivism is seen as fundamentally a politically conservative theory -- because?  Who knows really.  Mid-19th century American judges enforced the Fugitive Slave Act.  Why that was particularly positivist is never explained, why the judges are to be classified as positivist is not explained, nor any evidence adduced that the enforcement would have been different had they been more natural lawyers.  What distinctions like Natural Law and Positivism have to do with Normative Jurisprudence is left unexplained, and it is a serious problem.  There is no obvious reason to organize a discussion of normative jurisprudence in that way.  Positivists and Natural Law thinkers are all over the map with respect to normative theories.  There just isn't a normative jurisprudence attached to such schools.  Things don't get any better in the discussion of Critical Legal Studies.  Much of CLS never really had a normative jurisprudence of any kind, and what did was utopian.   

Jack's End

I have only about twenty pages left of Living Originalism.  The body of the second section is three chapters exploring the method of text and principle in application to particular topics.  The reading goes along fine, but it is heavily footnoted, as it should be for an academic work.  The notes, however, make clear that one needs to spend a good deal of time rummaging through lots of other articles and books in order to weigh how convincing the analysis is.  Or one might so think.  In fact, I think it pretty cleverly constructed to permit that as one option, but not a necessity.  The reason is that part of the methodology involves recognition that the arguments re the meaning and application of the Constitution should be (or perhaps have to be) accessible to and persuasive for people outside the academic law school setting.  It cannot be all, or even crucially, an account of historians or specialized lawyers, because of the grounding in the conception of the Constitution as framing a joint project (or something like one).  (Shapiro's Plan Theory there alright.)

But aside from the detailed citations, there are some issues that come up for a reader skimming and skipping endnotes, and that are not solved by the notes.  For example, what is meant by principle and how does one decide on identity of or for a principle?  I saw nothing helpful (so far at least) on that.

And that suggests that material on the topic should be included in a course on originalism and philosophy of law.  The lists grow.

Living Originalism

I am two-thirds fo the way through Balkin's Living Originalism. The book is divided into two parts, the first is the argument for his version of originalism and the second is an exposition of how the theory works as applied to some provisions of the Constitution and current issues.  The shorthand for Balkin's thoery is "text and principles."  It is originallist in the sense that understanding the Constitution starts with the meaning of the texts at the times adopted and the principles then embodied in the texts.  The contrast might be with Solum's semantic originalism in which the public meaning go the texts at the time of adoption determine interpretation, with the rest being 'construction' of the Constitution.  This is too short to set out the differences between Balkin and Solum, though they are substantial.  One of the interesting things about Living Originalism -- setting to one side the substance of the theory advanced -- is the way that Balkin argues his case.  The first part of the book is, in a number of ways, loosely argued.  It is not as closely or as detailed an argument as one might expect from a book.  Law review articles are long, but not long enough to substitute for a book.  I am not saying that the arguments are weak or poorly constructed.  It is that they are a bit loose-jointed.  They move along quickly.  Is it that the book is intended as a more popular rahter than academic effort?  It is quite accessible I think, so maybe that is it.  It is an interesting mix: the notes are quite detailed and useful, and that is where Balkin engages with other writers (for the most part).

One annoying feature is the repetition of examples about meaning or semantics that are ridiculous.  Balkin is another user of the example of "Domestic violence" meaning intra-familial violence and not civil disorder.  I find it hard to believe that high school students reading the Constitution think it is about family fights.  It is not just that the example is "fanciful" but that it is both unpersuasive and built on a plainly false view about written language.  The example supposes a univocal disposition for semantic content of clauses that I find very hard to believe. 

 

Changing Trains

I finished the first volume of Parfit's On What Matters some time ago. The aim of the book is to reconcile consequentialism and Kantian deontic moral theory. The argument is largely constructed by analysis of various examples with an eye to deontic explanations, and then the deontic explanations by consequentialist theory. (Not quite that order, but I think that is one way to read the overall structure.) That volume has elicited a good deal of discussion of the nature and role of reasons, and I think volume 2 takes up the topic in some detail. (Have not read volume 2 as yet.) The book sort of went off the tracks for me relatively early on. The argument formed by examples or cases, and then some analysis. The examples are familiar variations of the Trolley Problems. The Trolley Problems are all variant cases asking about one's intuitions re whether it is morally permissible (or obligatory or prohibited) to cause one death in order to avoid killing a larger number. The cases are, e.g., may one throw a switch causing a trolley to switch tracks killing one person but thereby saving five others. Then you push the one person off a bridge, or open a trap-door, and so on. They are found in discussion of the doctrine of double effect, for example. Here is the problem from volume 1: Parfit introduces examples and then moves to the explanation of how the outcome is made to fit with one or another interpretation of deontic rules. But what happens when the intuition about how the cases should be decided are not shared? Parfit does not argue for particular interpretations of the cases; instead, the argument is from his intuition about the case to its fit with, e.g., maxim of ends as he interprets the maxim. If one does not share the intuition, the rest becomes hypothetical (in the sense that it just seeing how the machine runs). Which means there is no argument about what matters, only a complicated exegesis of what matters to Parfit. Maybe this concern is addressed in volume 2. I will have to read it to find out.

Birthday

Today is the anniversary of the bird of Flann O'Brien a rather funny and unhappy man.  In fact, one of the great modernist writers.  For an appreciation, this post is a start.

Aristotle Would Not Have Approved

A new translation of Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics is out the newspaper tells me.  I read a version many years ago in graduate school and before that as an undergraduate -- Richard McKeon I think was the translator (maybe just for the undergraduate bit) - the Basic Aristotle anyway.  I remember being distinctly underwhelmed by Aristotle's Ethics. It all too often read like a collection of bromides and banalities -- along the lines of 'justice is giving everyone what they are due' which is helpful in no way at all.  But the NYT has a review of the new translation.  The headline suggests a very positive review it will be, and it is in an odd way.  Mr. Jaffa, the reviewer, is associated with the Claremont Institute.  As it turns out Jaffa is a devotee of Leo Strauss, whom Jaffa identifies as "the greatest philosopher of the 20th century."  That was no quite a surprise, coming in the second half of the review which seemed more about Churchill and Strauss than Aristotle.  In fact, as one can guess by now, it is quite positive about Strauss and goes on and on about Jeruselum and Athens (reconciling Biblical revelation and something Greek) and somewhat less about Aquinas.  But very little at all is said about the translation.  Truly -- two paragraphs total, discussing the indices, preface, afterward, and how to translate techne.  A comparison to other translations?  No.  A discussion of choices in this translation?  No again.  Somewhat more about the content of the Nichomachean Ethics, but far too little for it to be anything but backdrop to a genuinely weird discussion of Strauss and Churchill and exposition of one odd account of philosophy.  I have an objection to this -- one learns almost nothing about the work under review.  That might be fine if one thought Jaffa's views were somehow terribly important and any excuse would do to learn more.  But not even in oxygen deprived Claremont would that be so (air quality in Claremont is atrocious; the colleges are pretty).

I don't object to the praise for Strauss.  It strikes me as ridiculous, but it is interesting to see such different views in print.  There are lots of ways of thinking about politics and philosophy.  I doubt the review will induce anyone over 14 to join that church.  Not that they need any approval from me.  Here is what I mean:

Indeed, much of Strauss’s work is a radical attack — made with the greatest intellectual competence — against the latter-­day enemies of both the Bible and a Socratic Aristotle. Strauss maintained that Athens and Jerusalem, while disagreeing on the ultimate good, disagree very little, if at all, on what constitutes a morality both good in itself and the pathway to a higher good.

If the work is so good why do we need to be told it was "made with the greaest intellectual competence"?  What is a "Socratic Aristotle"?  I do not see how Aristotle could be Socratic in any interesting or useful sense.  I admit it made the morning paper more fun.

True Grit

The oon-agin off-again search for books to read aloud bore some fruit yesterday.  On a recent trip, I picked up a copy of True Grit (yes, that one).  The beginning of the book is perfect for reading aloud.  The movie, both versions, had good dialogue, and enough of it overlapped that it seemed to me likely that the source was the book and not screenwriting -- which reminds me I need to read one -- so the couple of dollars would likely get something worth reading.  (The other book I picked up as awful, or the first few pages which was all that I read.)  I started reading last night (goes with sports TV pretty well).  After the first page, I decided that it would serve very nicely for reading aloud.

It is harder than it should be to get recommendations for books to read aloud.  The last recommendation from King's English was a flop.  Did not read well, and wasn't even all that as a book to read silently.  I think it was called Lovers or some such.  Went no further than 10 pages before I set it on the recycle shelf.  But, can't all be on the same wavelength.  I read Smart Swarm based on a very positive review -- it was dull and thin.  Same review suggested Honeybee Democracy which I am finding much more interesting.  Maybe it is just the better illustrations.  Speaking of which, the illustration to the bird book over on the list are superb. 

Some of the things that make a book good to read aloud -- Sentences that are readable aloud.  Lots and lots of good books are pretty bad when read aloud, because the sentences are not structured for anyone to listen to them (rather than read them).  Voices that come across without having to do voices, although nothing wrong with doing voices.  Bearable chunks -- sections that read aloud in half and hour or 45 minutes.  Gets too tiring after that.  Should not take long to get through this book. 

Time to Read

Spent a long morning in the emergency room with the spouse.  Actually the very same room and curtained space I was in spring 2009.  Then sit around waiting on surgery outcomes.  Once the one you are with has gone off to surgery, the hospital turns out a nice place to read.  Comfortable chairs and moderately quiet.  I made it most of the way through Slocum's  Sailing Alone Around the World (there on the list).  The book is just what it says, the memoir of a fellow who sailed alone around the world in 1895 in a wooden sailboat he built himself.  It is surprisingly interesting given that much of it is abot sailing in this or that wind with waves of this other sort, most of which I am unsure about -- my experience sailing is pretty limited.  An absorbing book, and the author comes off well.  The hospital was remodeled recently (still in process actually), to good effect.  The interior spaces are far nicer than when I first went there.  An odd thing about hospitals in Zion is that the staff is, aside from the physical therapists, even heavier than the general population.  Land of the large.  I wonder why that is.