The decision in Union Gospel is built on the ministerial exemption afforded to religious institutions under the First Amendment of the US Constitution and, presumably, state constitutions. What sort of group qualifies as a religious institution for this purpose? Surely religious entities that are incorporated under applicable law -- churches, temples, and the like. Do confraternities count, i.e., lay organizations engaged in religious work or missions? Union Gospel is an employment case. Do its terms also apply to voluntary organizations? May a lay group bar from membership those not in compliance with its doctrines? I would guess it could, but that is a guess. I do not know the areas of applicable law well enough to offer more than that. But suppose the organization provides services, along the lines of Union Gospel. Does that change things, or is the important line whether it has employees? Or requests payment for (some) services?
In her concurrence, Justice Yu says: "Given our state’s long-standing commitment to eradicating discrimination and to fostering a diverse workforce, it is my greatest hope that religious institutions will recognize and embrace the choice to limit the “ministerial exception” to those employees for whom such an exception is absolutely necessary and grounded in sound reason and purpose. After all, the right to exclude the LGBTQ+ community from ministerial employment by religious institutions is not a right that must be exercised. Rather, it is a choice by that religious institution and it is a choice that is not governed by an external judicial doctrine but rather one carved out by the religious entity itself." (¶46, emphasis added.) I wonder what Justice Yu means by "absolutely necessary and grounded in sound reason and purpose". In the instant case, what sort of factors would count toward "absolutely necessary and grounded in sound reason and purpose"? Would it be enough to point to salient passage in the Christian Bible? IS some further doctrinal defense needed? Is the religious belief or beliefs to be grounded in reason, not revelation? To the second emphasized phrase, is it appropriate to put the issue in such voluntaristic terms? What does Justice Yu mean by choice? Is it her thought that, e.g., whether to believe in pre-destination is a matter of choice for Calvinists? Do the religious choose what to believe? I think the answer is a rather mixed response -- conversion is not always a choice, and I think normally not really voluntaristic. In other words, is the identity put at issue not a fundamental aspect of identity, quite unlike whether to be a lawyer or a teacher? Or, to be a bit tendentious, is religious identity less important than sexual orientation?
The passage, for me, reads as a call to religious institutions to minimize their religious commitments, and to embody a certain lack of respect for the religious. Washington permits ideological legal services I believe, e.g., legal services that represent particular causes or groups. Lawyers limit their practices in all sorts of ways. Why would it be that modeling the religious commitment to alleviating need not count as "elucidating or teaching" the faith?
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