The Laws of Nature look like reasoning norms or rational guidance. That is, if one considered the circumstances entirely or solely as a rational agent, then the Laws of Nature would be conclusions which guide action. So maybe norms of practical reason. But norms so far as they are the inevitable result of reasoning about the circumstances. They cannot just be good advice or rules of thumb. Those things are not what one would call laws. Among other reasons, there is nothing wrong or condemnable in ignoring or not following or even transgressing advice or rules of thumb. It is not immoral to ignore advice or not weigh it properly, at least absent some pretty special conditions. The conduct might turn out poorly and in that sense one was wrong, but that is not the right sense of wrong. It is like betting wrong, not like doing something wrong (immoral). Whatever it is that may be wrong it is not that not adhering to the advice considered alone was wrong. Really the only wrong is the outcome, whose status does not change depending on whether preceded by advice followed or not.
The Laws of Nature also do not look like moral laws. It may be unwise or imprudent to go contrary to one more of the Laws of Nature, but that would not make the conduct immoral. That might work if there is some kind of moral obligation to live well or to flourish, or more closely to the problem, a moral obligation to follow reason. But that sort of obligation is obscure. It cannot be that poor reasoners are by that immoral persons. I fail statistics so I am evil or vicious?
The Laws of Nature look much more to me to be rules of reasoning, and if moral laws then moral laws derivative from or based on demands of rationality. It all looks, again, that poor reasoning is immoral, that failing to see what rationality requires is a moral failing as well as a defect of reasoning. That, I think, cannot be right. Not being any good at understanding statistics is not a moral failing or a character defect. Is there some line dividing forms of rationality or forms of reasoning so that some reasoning about circumstances is especially normative or somehow grounds or constitutes moral norms and others are not?
What would be wrong (!) in leaving the Laws of Nature as rules of reasoning about the human condition, or, as I prefer, circumstances?
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