The Utah Court of Appeals handed down a peculiar decision today on defaults and default judgments. The issue in Davis v. Goldsworthy was whether a trail court could dismiss a complaint notwithstanding that a default had been entered against the defendant. This is the second appeal of the case. In the first, Davis argued that the trial court had improperly lifted the default already entered against Goldsworthy. The trial court, after lifting the default, considered and granted a motion to dismiss. Last time up, the Court of Appeals reversed the lifting of the default and remanded for further consideration. So, on remand the trial court retained the entry of default but dismissed the complaint on the grounds that, if it could consider the motion to dismiss, it would be granted. As a result, the trial court believed that it could not enter a default judgment based on the complaint and therefore dismissed the case. Davis takes it up to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals agrees that the default was properly left in place and that the trial court properly dismissed the case because default judgment could not be entered. Davis's argument that it was improper to consider the motion to dismiss (the default entailing that the Goldsworthy was not permitted to defend, including by filing motions to dismiss) was unavailing.
Here is what is odd about the opinion: It is true that a default judgment must be based on the factual allegations of the complaint. A complaint which is factually insufficient to support judgment cannot support default judgment. But there is no rule which bars a plaintiff from introducing evidence to support judgment. In fact, in a range of cases a plaintiff in a default proceeding is required to introduce evidence of damages. See, for example, Rule 55(b)(2). The Court of Appeals cites neither case law, rule, nor statute which limits introduction of evidence following entry of default and in support of a default judgment. Because it is permissible to offer evidence, it at least odd that Davis was barred from the opportunity to cure defects in his complaint through introduction of evidence. It may be that the Court of Appeals thought that he could offer evidence sufficient for judgment only on the basis of some claim which his complaint did not give notice of, but that is not what they say. And, given notice pleading, it would seem that so long as the claim proven is consistent with the complaint, he should have been permitted to proceed., to at least try The Court of Appeals' argument seems to be that there can be nothing between entry of default and default judgment, which I think is error.
At paragraph 12 the Court of Appeals claims that"there is nothing in Skanchy or the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that suggests that a defaulting party may not challenge the legal basis of the pleadings before the trial court enters judgment on the default." Rule 55 is modeled on the Federal rule, and is virtually identical to a host of rules in other states. The Rule therefore must be interpreted in light of those sources. In federal court, default cuts off the defendant's right to defend (and a motion challenging adequacy of pleadings is defense). That has been law since 1927 - Clifton v. Tomb 21 F.2d 893, 897. And, if the allegations are insufficient to support judgment, the court may (and should) hold a hearing providing the plaintiff opportunity o provide an appropriate record. Quirindongo Pacheco v. Rolon Morales, 953 F.2d 15, 16. Skanchy involved a default judgment in which no evidence beyond the allegations of the complaint were offered to support liability. The case does not say that evidentiary supplementation is barred. And that really is the heart of what is troubling about the Davis decision -- the court seems to be of the view that a plaintiff may not supplement the allegations of the complaint, except on the question of damages. Neither the Rule nor the case law say that.
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