The second structural issue for libertarian theories can be seen as the problem of children writ large, that is, the problem of subsequent generations. Structurally, the problem (or set of problems) come about because there are and will be subsequent generations -- people show up long after allocation or appropriation of resources. For those who come later, they are prevented from acquiring anything without the good graces of predecessors. It makes no real difference if there is still space available, that the late-comers can pick up and go elsewhere. The key is that they enter the fray at a disadvantage merely in virtue of later arrival. The legitimacy of hte prior holdings is in question because there is no account which explains why appearance on the scene should be the basis for acquisition, yet that is crucial. Acquisition accounts cannot just be luck of the draw, because that cannot provide reasons for later arriving people to abide by prior acquisitions. Structurally, libertarianism seems plausible when we elide the generational aspects of human living.
Maybe the argument would be that the later arrivals are compensated for more limited choices by receipt of the social benefits of prior development. I don't see how that argument runs empirically. Maybe it is just that for long periods it was about as easy to move on as to stay -- mass and rapid emigration suggests as much. But of course one wold have to be old enough to make such moves, and it seems rather doubtful that it was solitary travelers. Anyway, the benefit argument is inconsistent with libertarian principles and will lead to rather different political theories.
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