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April 30, 2010 in Current Affairs | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Lloyd’s new version of Hobbes is a defense of the view that the fundamental principle of Hobbes’ moral and political theory is a “reciprocity theorem.” That is, ‘do not do to others what you would have them not do to you.’ (I wonder if that is the same as ‘do not do to others what you don’t want done to you’? Looks like it to me.) That is different from ‘do to others what you would have them do to you’ – which is too strong a principle. It is also one that generates some odd outcomes if one is not careful about the level of description – sexual objectification would quickly get out of hand, for example. The reciprocity principle Lloyd suggests for Hobbes (‘do not do…’) also needs the right level of description for the doing one is not to do. Description levels are always tricky – is it religious proselytizing, teaching the true religion, educating about the true nature of the world, etc.? No criticism intended; I don’t know quite how one argues for the correct description, but I do think that the level of abstraction in description is crucial for a reasonable understanding of things, or I should say actions.
The reciprocity theorem is not what I would have expected to be extracted from Hobbes’ work. I learned it in the old tradition, and that theorem is a ways from the nasty, brutish and short people (okay, lives – no reason to think state of nature makes people shorter than otherwise) of the purely self-interested agent acting to his or her own advantage. How will she get to it? Assuming Lloyd does, it is a very interesting turn for Hobbesianism. And it might fight with the notion of public reason, which has fallen off the radar a bit in recent years. It is leads to an important problem on what sorts of reasons should could for political action, or legislation, in a liberal democratic state. Is it acceptable to argue for enactments because God would like it? I don’t think so, but then one has to explain why that sort of reason is not a good reason for politics but perfectly fine for ordering one’s moral life. (I don’t believe the latter either, but I think it is required for a liberal political state. And what sort of non-democratic states are also liberal?)
April 29, 2010 in Philosophy, Political Theory | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
April 28, 2010 in Law | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
April 27, 2010 in Books, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy, Political Theory | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Zion provides more fodder for law school discussions. As part of divorce proceedings, father has been barred from discussing his belief in polygamy with his minor children. I have not located the actual order, so there is just the news report. (The Tribune is particularly bad on legal reporting so no assurance the facts relate closely to the report.) Based on the news, father has adopted the views of one the fundamentalist Mormon groups, including acceptance of polygamy. (I don't know if blood atonement is part of that branch's set of doctrines or not.) Mother rejects such stuff and divorces Father. COurt says visitations with kids cannot involve discussion of polygamy or transport to the polygamous town. It seems a big part of the explanation is that it would be dangerous for the minor children to be taught that this form of criminal conduct is a good thing, polygamy being a felony here in Zion.
Of course, the father is advancing an argument that this infringes his First Amendment rights to discuss his religious beliefs with this children, and that it is contrary to Utah case law to bar discussion of polygamy. I have to look at the case referred to. Still, I don't see why it would be okay to tell your children what a good thing one kind of felony is when you don't get to talk about other kinds of felonies being good. Suppose father wanted to tell his children about the good in marijuana consumption? I suppose an interesting comparative case would be divorce of parents, one of whom leaves Santeria. The problem is that animal sacrifice within religious practice is not a crime, but polygamy is. The 1991 case seems to have been concerned with whether a polygamous couple could, for that reason alone, be barred from adoption.
Update: The 1991 case is Matter of Adoption of W.A.T., 808 P.2d 1083 (1991 Utah). Very much focused on adoption.
April 26, 2010 in Current Affairs, Law, Law & Political Theory, Philosophy | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
The second structural issue for libertarian theories can be seen as the problem of children writ large, that is, the problem of subsequent generations. Structurally, the problem (or set of problems) come about because there are and will be subsequent generations -- people show up long after allocation or appropriation of resources. For those who come later, they are prevented from acquiring anything without the good graces of predecessors. It makes no real difference if there is still space available, that the late-comers can pick up and go elsewhere. The key is that they enter the fray at a disadvantage merely in virtue of later arrival. The legitimacy of hte prior holdings is in question because there is no account which explains why appearance on the scene should be the basis for acquisition, yet that is crucial. Acquisition accounts cannot just be luck of the draw, because that cannot provide reasons for later arriving people to abide by prior acquisitions. Structurally, libertarianism seems plausible when we elide the generational aspects of human living.
Maybe the argument would be that the later arrivals are compensated for more limited choices by receipt of the social benefits of prior development. I don't see how that argument runs empirically. Maybe it is just that for long periods it was about as easy to move on as to stay -- mass and rapid emigration suggests as much. But of course one wold have to be old enough to make such moves, and it seems rather doubtful that it was solitary travelers. Anyway, the benefit argument is inconsistent with libertarian principles and will lead to rather different political theories.
April 20, 2010 in Philosophy, Political Theory | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
At Crooked Timber, they have been making jokes about libertarianism and slavery. But neither the posts nor the comments really come to grips with the structurl issues involved in any libertarian political theory. Two which I think particularly interesting concern families and generations, or passage of time. The jokes aout libertarians owning their children are on to something. It does not matter if parents own their children as slaves – I would assume that the ownership would lie with the mother rather than the father. The mother contributes a goood deal more to the creation and maintenance of the child, I don’t see why the libertarian is really committed to slavery; the child is likely to meet the requirements for personhood under the political theory. The problem, which may or may not lead to a suggestion of slavery, is structural, and ties to the fact of passing time, generations. The difficulty for the child is tht it owns nothing but its labor, which has no value. (It is kind of amusing that libertarianism may be the last bastion of the labor theory of value – how else to get initial ownership of things? What other grounds for appropriation would be available given that st=ocial structures and practices are subsequent in the political theory?) So the child cn come to own only what is given to it as gift. Insofar as what is involved are gifts, there is no obligation, at least political opbligation sufficient for enforcement by the state, to make the gifts. And thus nothing wrong, from the perspective of the community, with refusing to make the gifts. Thus, starving or otherwise ending the lives of children is not a problem for politics. The normal move is recourse to moral duty. I find that a curious move in context.
Suppose it is immoral to refuse gifts to one’s own or others’ children. Not a particularly heroic assumption. But, in the nature of the theory, it is a duty which is outside the purview of the state (or other organization able to compel conduct legitimately). The upshot then is that conformance to the relevant moral duty (or duties) is voluntary, and enforceable only through informal social mechanism, e.g., remonstration. Of course, then, libertarians are committed to decontrol of abortion.
April 20, 2010 in Political Theory | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
April 20, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
April 16, 2010 in Law | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
So far there have been two studies of the East Anglia Climate Center. The Center was exonerated in both studies. Today's report found that there was no untoward manipulation of data.
The University of East Anglia welcomed Wednesday's report. "The veracity of CRU's research remains intact after this examination," it said. "It is gratifying to us that the Oxburgh Report points out that CRU has done a public service of great value by carrying out meticulous work on temperature records when it was unfashionable and attracted little scientific interest," it said. It also welcomed the report's its criticisms, especially its recommendations that scientists engage more fully with the wider statistics community.
and
The report said the panel had seen "no evidence of any deliberate scientific malpractice in any of the work of the Climatic Research Unit.…Rather we found a small group of dedicated if slightly disorganized researchers who were ill-prepared for being the focus of public attention."
Apologies for slandering reputations? Not forthcoming yet. But there is still one more study to be completed. Odds are that too will not result in withdrawal of any of the various charges leveled against the Center.
April 15, 2010 in Current Affairs | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
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