Leiter has a very good discussion of the normative infirmity of originalist interpretive theories, as defended recently by Rappaport (among others). Leiter has taken care to explicate in some detail why the majoritarian and supermajoritarian arguments for originalism fail.
His reading of my discussion as claiming that consent is necessary for a normative political theory is an understandable mistake. I had intended to offer consent as a contrast, to illustrate the goal (as it were) which the various majoritarians need to make. It is not unreasonable to see the expression as suggesting a stronger claim, so that error is more mine. My view is that consent is a possible basis for political obligation, although I cannot see how it apply to the United States (or anywhere else that comes to mind at the moment). I suspect, but cannot prove, that a broadly contractarian foundation may be available, although more in the line of Hume than Kant. That is a discussion for another day.
One interesting aspect of the discussion is the curious ordering of analysis. Interpretive theories are a curious place to locate normative claims. It is possible (I think pretty likely) that normative theories put constraints on the potential range of plausible interpretive theories, but I don't see how you get the relationship running the other way (which I think is what Barnett and Rappaport are up to).
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