I also recently read West's Normative Jurisprudence. I had found a number of West's works interesting, and helpful, and so was looking forward to reading the Introduction. Unfortunately, it turned out to be a terrible book. It read as though a couple of articles had been mashed together. The arguments seemed ill-considered in large and small ways. And inconsistencies abounded. Dworkin is a natural law theorist in chapter 1, while his account of judging is attributed to Legal Positivist in Chapter 3. Legal Positivism is seen as fundamentally a politically conservative theory -- because? Who knows really. Mid-19th century American judges enforced the Fugitive Slave Act. Why that was particularly positivist is never explained, why the judges are to be classified as positivist is not explained, nor any evidence adduced that the enforcement would have been different had they been more natural lawyers. What distinctions like Natural Law and Positivism have to do with Normative Jurisprudence is left unexplained, and it is a serious problem. There is no obvious reason to organize a discussion of normative jurisprudence in that way. Positivists and Natural Law thinkers are all over the map with respect to normative theories. There just isn't a normative jurisprudence attached to such schools. Things don't get any better in the discussion of Critical Legal Studies. Much of CLS never really had a normative jurisprudence of any kind, and what did was utopian.