The Utah Court of Appeals handed down another decision today returning a case for resentencing of the defendant because the sentence of the trial court was too low -- Williams.
¶3 Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that this
court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner,
at any time. See Utah R. App. P. 22(e). A sentence is illegal, and therefore void,
when it is "beyond the authorized statutory range." State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT
App 9, ¶ 15, 84 P.3d 854. The Utah Supreme Court has clarified that a sentence
less than that sentence mandated by statute constitutes an illegal sentence
because it does not comply with the requirements of the statute. See State v.
Babbel, 813 P.2d 86, 87 (Utah 1991).
I have already noted that I think the interpretation of the "beyond the authorized statutory range" should not mean or include "less than the statutory range" if ordinary English applies. The State Supreme Court has repeatedly held that statutes are to be interpreted according to the ordinary meaning of the words, where possible. But set that aside. What is a bit disturbing in Williams is that the citations in Paragraph 3 look like mistakes. Here is the cite paragraph in Thorkelson:
¶ 15 While rule 22(e) allows a court to review an illegal sentence at any time, it must be “narrowly circumscribed” to prevent abuse. State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51,¶ 5, 48 P.3d 228. The Utah Supreme Court has held that a rule 22(e) illegal sentence is a “patently” illegal sentence, State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 860 (Utah 1995), or a “manifestly” illegal sentence, Telford, 2002 UT 51 at ¶ 5, 48 P.3d 228. A “patently” or “manifestly” illegal sentence generally occurs in one of two situations: (1) where the sentencing court has no jurisdiction, or (2) where the sentence is beyond the authorized statutory range. See id. at n. 1. Thorkelson's challenges to his sentences involve neither situation. Rather, the errors raised by Thorkelson can be described as ordinary or “run-of-the-mill” errors regularly reviewed on appeal under rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
That paragraph provides no support for the notion that a too-short sentence is "beyond the statutory range". All it says is that illegal sentences are appealable and illegal sentences are those rendered by a court without jurisdiction or which are beyond the statutory provisiosns. As Williams involves a too-short sentence, Thorkelson is of no interest. So, then, what about Babbel? There we have a discussion of illegal sentences, viz., that an illegal sentence is void, ab initio apparently, and so the (trial?) court retains jurisdiction to correct and impose a legal sentence. By implication, I suppose, an illegal sentence is one too lenient. That decision was under a statute, not a Rule of Criminal Procedure. It also seems to assume the conclusion rather than offer any explanation or justification. The old statute and the current rule use the language 'beyond'. What is bothersome is not the result but the road to it. As the Court elsewhere dwells at length on the doctrine that ordinary English is to govern, why the departure? As the Court controls the Rules, why not fix the language?
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