About a week ago reading the NYT blog on philosophy, the writer spent some time explaining how the universe is not deterministic. The discussion of whether the universe was deterministic was part of an argument that free will was possible (well, I think the ultimate conclusion was for more than mere possibility). I am lost about why it would matter to free will if the universe was deterministic or not. In the first place, the basic problem of free will is the second, not the first, term. What is a 'will' and how does it cause things to happen? Unless one is an idealist of some kind, it is very hard to know what is being talked about. Determinist universe is a problem for the 'free' part, not fatal. It is the will part that is a real block. It can't be an experience, because, whatever the status of experiences, they are not causally effective. Anyway, for medium size objects, it is a bit hard to find the non-deterministic world the writer wants. Putting a pan of water over an open flame will not freeze it, whatever is going on at the quantum level. So we make choices -- that is not free will. To make the economy work well, people act as if what happens is reward of merit (some combination of diligence, good ideas, etc.). Pretty clear from history that the view is false.
One of the reasons I've Kant to be pernicious is because the theories he offers are, in the end, solipsistic idealism (not sure there is any other sort in the end).
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